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Abstract: This study uses an agent-based computational labor market framework
to undertake a systematic experimental investigation of the relationship between job
capacity, job concentration, and market power. Job capacity is measured by the ratio
of total potential job openings to total potential work offers, and job concentration is
measured by the ratio of work suppliers to employers. For each setting of the capac
ity and concentration treatment factors, work suppliers and employers repeatedly seek
V- preferred worksite partners based on continually updated expected utility, engage in
efficiency-wage worksite interactions modelled as prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve
their worksite behaviors over time. The main finding is that job capacity consistently
trumps job concentration when it comes to predicting the relative ability of work sup-
pliers and employers to exercise market power. Controlling for job capacity, job con
centration has only small unsystematic effects on attained market power levels.
Keywords: Labor market dynamics; market power; job capacity; job concentra
tion; adaptive search; networks; endogenous interactions; agent-based computational
economics; evolutionary game.
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1. Introduction
Market power refers to the abiUty of seUers or buyers to exert a perceptible control over market
\t . , , , ^
outcomes that enables them to attain higher individual welfare levels than they would achieve
under competitive market conditions. Understanding the relationship between market structure,
market behavior, and market power in markets with multiple agents engaged in repeated strategic
interactions has been a major focus ofanalytical, empirical, and human-subject experimental re
searchers in industrial organization since the early nineteen seventies. To date, however, definitive
conclusions'have been difficult to obtain.
For example, Tirole (1988, Part II)presents a unified theoretical treatment of oligopoly decision
making interms of noncooperative game theory. He focuses on the choice of price, capacity, product
positioning, research and development, and other strategic variables. Only equilibrium behavior
is considered, however; and a common finding for his games with incomplete information is that
multiple eqiulibria exist with widely differing characteristics. Thequestion then arises: given agents
with incomplete information and limited computational capabilities, under what conditions would
these agents learn to coordinate on one typeofequilibrium versus another, and what would be the
resulting dynamic implications for market power?
In a survey of empirical work on market power in industrial organization, Bresnahan (1989,
pp. 1051-1055) summarizes his overall findings as follows: "although the (new empirical industrial
organization) has had a great deal to say about measuring market power, it has had very little,
as yet, to say about the causes of market power." Holt (1995, Section VII) notes that, although
the nonmonopolized double auction is widely used in experimental research with human subjects,
whether market power has any efficiency effects in this context remains an open issue. For posted-
offer auctions. Holt points' out that capacity constraints ^d some forms of traihsactions costs have
I .y- ,
reliably produced supra-competitive prices in ^perinients performed'by himself and several-other
researchers; but so far the number of experiments.along these lines h^ been small.
This lack ofdefinitive results reflects the complex nature ofmarket power in actual or sinmlated
real-world markets. Given this complexity, it would seem useful to complement these previous
approaches to the study of market power with controlled computational experiments.
This paper investigates the evolution of market power in the context of a computational labor
market framework with strategically interacting work suppliers and employers.^ As will be clar
ified in Section 2, the labor market framework is a flexible computational laboratory permitting
experiments with a wide variety of alternative specifications for the exogenous aspects of market
structure and agent attributes. The primary purpose of this study, however, is to take a first cut
at the computational study of market power in relation to market structure and market behavior
over time by specifying these exogenous aspects in relatively simple terms.
Thus, as implemented for this study, the labor market framework comprises multiple work
suppliers and employers who repeatedly participate in costly searches for worksite partners on
the basis of continually updated expected utility, engage in efficiency-wage worksite interactions
modelled as prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their worksite strategies over time on the basis
of the earnings secured by these strategies in past worksite interactions. All work suppliers are
assumed to have the same size tug, where wq is themaximum number ofpotential work offers that
each work supplier can make. Similarly, all employers are assumed to have the same size eg, where
eq is the maximum number of job openings that each employer can provide. Moreover, there is no
entry into, or exit from, the labor market; the number NW of work suppliers and the number NE
of employers are both held fixed during the course of each experimental run.
Market power for work suppliers is measured by the degree to which their average attained
welfare level deviates from the average welfare level that they would obtain in a competitive (full
=A preliminary version of this labor maxket framework was presented in Tesfatsion (1998) as aspecial case of
the Trade Network Game (TNG) model developed in Tesfatsion (1997a,b) for studying the evolution of byer-seU-
trade networks. Aversion of the framework with a different fitness measure is also used in Tesfatsion (1999) to
examine hysteresis (path dependency) in labor markets. The framework is an example of agent-b^ed computation^
economics (ACE) modeUing. ACE is the computational study of economies modelled as evolving decentr^zed
systems of autonomous interacting agents. For various ACE-related resources, including surveys, re^ings, software,
and pointers to research groups, see the ACE web site at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm.
employmentj market outcome under the assumption of mutually cooperative worksite behavior.
Market power for employers is similarly defined..
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to postulate that the extent to which market ,power accrues to
work suppliers or employers in the labor market framework depends in part, on job capacitii. a^
measured by the ratio {NE -eq)/{NW •wq] of total potential job openings to total potential work
offers, and on job concentration as measured by the ratio NWjNE ofthe total number of work
suppliers to the total number of employers. Job capacity measures the total potential availability
of job openings relative to work pffers, whereas job concentration measures the extent to which
control over job openings is concentrated among relatively few employers.^ By construction, for
any given level of job concentration, job capacity varies inversely with the size wq of each work,
supplier and directly with the size eq of each employer.
The joint implications of job capacity and job concentration for the exercise of"market power
are not easy to predict a prion. Fot example, what is the effect on welfare and market power when
the labor market framework comprises twelve work suppliers, each able to make one work offer,
together with six employers who each have four job openings? Job openings' are in excess supply,
which would appear to favor monopoly power by work suppliers,'but job'openirigs are concentrated
in relatively few hands, which would appear.to favor monopsony power by employers.
The experimental design of this study^ consists of the systematic variation, from high to low, of
both job capacity and job concentration. For each given specification of these two market structure
conditions, twenty different runs are generated using twenty different pseudo-random number seed
values.^ In examining the resulting run histories, particular attention is focused on the experimental
determination of correlations between market structure and the formation of networks among work
^The potential importance of distinguishing between capacity and concentration effects has been emphasized by
Holt (1995, p. 396) in the context of posted-offer auction experiments: "By reassigning units of capacity from one
seller to another, there is no change in either market supply or excess supply at supra>competitive prices, yet market
power can change."
^AU experiments reported in this study are implemented using version 105c of the Trade Network Game (TNG)
sourcecode developedby McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999),'which'ih turn is supported by SimBioSys, a generalC++
dass taniework for evolutionary simulations developed by McFadzean (1995). Source code for both the TNG and
SimBioSys can be downloaded as freeware at the' current author's web site, along with extensive user instructions.
suppliers and employers, and between network formations and the types of worksiie behavior.s.
welfare outcomes, and market power outcomes that these networks support.
The primary objective ofthis study is to test the following four hypotheses regarding tlie impart
of job capacity and job concentration on the ability of work suppliers and employers lo exercise
market power:
Hi: Relative Market Power Hypothesis for Job Capacity, (a) The ability of work suppli
ers to exercise market power is less than the ability of employers to exercise market power in
conditions of tight or balanced job capacity: and (b) the ability of work suppliers to exercise
market power is greater than the ability ofemployers to exercise market power in conditions
of excess job capacity.
H2: Relative Market Power Hypothesis for Job Concentration, (a) The ability of work
suppliers to exercise market power is less than the ability of employers to exercise market
power in conditions ofhigh orbalanced job concentration; and (b) the ability ofwork suppliers
to exercise market power is greater than the ability of employers to exercise niarket power in
conditions of low job concentration.
H3: Job Capacity Sensitivity Hypothesis, (a) The ability ofwork suppliers to exercise mar^
ket power increases as job capacity increases, all else equal; and (b) the ability of employers
to exercise market power decreases as job capacity increases, all else equal.
H4: Job Concentration Sensitivity Hypothesis, (a) The ability ofwork suppliers to exercise
market power increases as job concentration decreases, all else equal; and (b) the ability of
employers to exercise market power decreases as job concentration decrease, all else equal.
Hypotheses H3 and H4 can hold simultaneously without contradiction. However, hypotheses Hl(b)
and H2{a) yield contradictory predictions in conditions of excess job capacity and high or balanced
job concentration, and hypotheses Hl(a) and H2(b) yield contradicatory predictions in conditions
oftight or balanced job capacity and'low job concentration.
The main finding of this study at the aggregate data level is that, job capacity is the dominant
factor affecting the ability of work suppliers and employers to exercise market power. Aggregate
market power outcomes strongly-support the job capacity hypotheses HI and H3.(a) and weakly
support the job capacity hypothesis H3(b), -but they provide little support for either of the job
concentration hypotheses H2 or H4. Surprisingly, controlling for job capacity, job concentration
has only small unsystematic effects on attained market power leyels.
To better understand these aggregate market power findings, the complicated nonlinear relations
hnking market structure, market behavior, and market power ,are carefully examined at a more
disaggregated level. This exaniination reveals even istronger support for the aggregate data finding
that job capacity is the key variable determining the relative market power of work .suppliers, and
employers.'For example, in contrast to aggregate dataindications, it-is shown that thejob capacity
hypothesis H3(b) is strongly supported ifa small number of sample economies are,omitted for which
complete coordination failure' occurs and all agents perform extremely poorly. The disaggregated
data also highlight the importance ofjob search costs and behavioral flexibility (provocability),for
the realistic assessment of market power opportunities ex ante and the accurate measurement of
market power ex post. ;
The labor market framework is described in .Section 2. In Section 3,. descriptive statistics
are constructed for the ex post classification of,network formations, worksite behaviors, welfare
outcomes, and market power outcomes.. The experimental design, of the study is explained in
Section 4, and experimental findings.are discussed,in Section 5. Concltiding remarks are given in
Section 6. ' , : - ^ ^
2. Labor Market Framework
The labor market framewprk outlined below differs in several essential respects from standard labor
market models [e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith (1997)]. First; it is.a dynamic process model defined
algorithmically in terms of the internal states and behavioral rules characterizing work -suppliers
and employers rather than by the usual system of demand, supply, and equilibrium equations.
The only equations that arise in the model are those used by the agents themselves to summarize
observed aspects of their world and to implement their behavioral rules. Second, agents attempt lo
learn about the behavioral rules of other agents even as these rules are coevolving over time. Third,
starting from given initial conditions, all events are contingent on agent-initiated interactions and
occur in a path-dependent time line. The analogy to a culture growing in a petri dish, observed by
a researcher but not disturbed, is apt.
The labor market framework comprises NW work suppliers who make work offers and NE
employers who receive work offers, where NW and NE can be any positive integers. Each work
supplier can havework offers outstanding to no more than wqemployers at any given time, and each
employer can accept work offers from no more than eq work suppliers at any given time, where the
work offer quota wq and the employer acceptance quota eq can be anypositive integers.® Although
highly simplified, these parametric specifications will be seen in Section 4, below, to permit the
study of labor markets operating under a variety of job capacity and job concentration conditions.
As seen in Table 1, work suppliers and employers are modelled as autonomous endogenously-
interacting agents with internalized social norms, internally stored state information, and internal
behavioral rules. Each agent,whether a work supplier or an employer, has this same general internal
structure. However, work suppliers differ from employers in terms oftheir specific market protocols,
fixed attributes, and initial endowments; and all agents can acquire different state information and
evolve different worksite behavioral rules® over time on the basis of their past experiences. Note,
in particular, that all agents have stored addresses for other agents together with internalized
market protocols for communication. These features permit agents tocommunicate state-dependent
^When wq exceeds 1, each work supplier can be interpreted as some type of information service provider (e.g.,
broker or consultant) that is able to supply services to at most wq employers at a time or as some type of union
organization that is able to oversee work contracts with at most wq employers at a time.
®ln principle, agents could evolve any or aU of their behavioral rules, but for current study purposes only the
evolution of worksite behavior<il rules is considered.
messages to other agents at event-triggered', times, a' feature ,not_ present in. standard economic
models. As will clarified; below;'the-work suppliers and employers depend on this communication
ability to seek but and secure worksite partners on an ongoing adaptive basis.
Insert Table 1 about here
As outlined in Table 2, activities in the labor market framework are divided into a sequence
of generations. Each work supplier and employer in the initial generation is assigned a randomly
generated rule governing his worksite behavior together with initial expected utility assessments
regarding potential worksite partners. The work suppliers and employers then enter into a trade
I ' *
cycle loop during which they repeatedly search for preferred worksite partners on the basis of their
current expected utility assessments, engage in efficiency-wage worksite interactions modelled as
prisoner's dilemma games, and update their expected utility assessments to take into account newly
' I ' ^ 1 •
incurred job search costs andworksite payoffs. At the endofthe trade cycle loop, the work suppliers
and employers each separately evolve (structurally modify) their worksite behavioral rules b^ed
on the past utility outcomes secured with these rules, and a new generation then commences.
Insert Table 2 about here
' • t % '
The particular module specifications used'in all experiments reported-below wiU nowj'be de
scribedin roughly the order depicted in Table 27 ' •
Matches between work suppliers and' employers are determined using a one-sided offer auction,-
a modified version of the "deferred''acceptance rhechanism" originally studied by Gale and Shap-
ley (1962).® Underthe terms of this auction, hereafter referred to as the deferred choice and, refusal
(DCR) mechanism, each work supplier submits work offers to a maximum! of ty^ employers he ranks
^All experiments reported in this paper are implemented using version 105c of the Trade Network Game. (TNG)
source code developed by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999). The latter study provides a detailed discussion of all
module implementations. In addition, the ..TNG source code (with extensive comment statements and user instruc
tions) can be downloaded as freeware from the current author's web site, permitting aJl module'implementations to
be specifically viewed-in source code form. '
®See Roth'and Sotomayor (1990) for a carefal.detailed discussion ofGale-Shapley deferred acceptance matching
mechanisms,'including a discussion of the way in which.therAssociatiqn ofAmerican Medical Colleges since WWIIhas
slowly evolved such an algorithm (the National Intern Matching Program) as a way ofmatching interns to hospitals.
as most preferable on the basis of expected utility and who he judges to be tolerable in the sense
that their expected utility is not negative. Similarly, each employer selects up to eq of his received
work offers that he finds tolerable and most preferableon the basis of expected utility and he places
them on a waiting list; all other work offers are refused. Work suppliers redirect refused work offers
to any tolerable preferred employers who have not yet refused them. Once employers stop receiving
new work offers, they accept all work offers currently on their waiting lists.
A work supplier incurs a job search cost in the form of a negative refusal payoffR each and
every time that an employer refuses one ofhis work offers during a trade cycle; the employer who
does the refusing is not penalized.^ A work supplier or employer who neither submits nor accepts
work offers during a trade cycle receives an inactivity payoff 0for the entire trade cycle. The refusal
and inactivity payoffs are each assumed to be measured in utility terms.
If an employer accepts a work offer from a work supplier in any given trade cycle, the work
supplier and employer are said to be matched for that trade cycle. Cach match constitutes a
mutually agreed upon contract stating that the work supplier shall supply labor services at the
worksite of the employer until the beginning of the next trade cycle. These contracts are risky in
that outcomes are not assured.
Specifically, each matched work supplier and employer engage ina worksite interaction modelled
as a two-person' prisoner's dilemma game reflecting the basic efficiency wage hypothesis that work
effort levels are affected by overall working conditions (e.g., wage levels, respectful treatment, safety
considerations). The work supplier can either cooperate (exert high work effort) or defect (engage
in shirking). Similarly, the employer can either cooperate (provide good working conditions) or
defect (provide substandard working conditions).
The range of possible worksite payoffs is assumed to be the same for each worksite interaction in
each trade cycle: namely, as seen in Table 3, a cooperator whose worksite partner defects receives
®This modelling for job search costs is equivalent to assuming the following two conditions: (i) each work supplier
must pay ajob search cost for each work offer he makes to an employer; and (ii) any work supplier whose work offer is
accepted is able to recoup the job search costs he incurred in making this work offer through his subsequent worksite
payoff.
the lowest possible payoff i (sucker payoff): at defector-whose worksite partner.also defects receives
the next lowest payoff D (mutual-defection payoff): a cooperator whose worksite ..partner .also
cooperates receives a higher payoff C (mutual cooperation payoff); and a defector, vwhose worksite
partner cooperates receives the highest possible payoff /T'(temptation payoff)* ,
Insert Table 3 about here
• I » , ,
The worksite payoffs'inTable 3are assumed, to be measured in utility terms, and tobe normal
ized aboul; the inactivity payoff 0 so that L < D <iO <'C < B. Thus, a work supplier or employer
that ends up either as a sucker with payoff Lorin a-mutual defection relation withpayoff D receives
negative utility, a worse outcome than inactivity (unemployment or vac^cy). These worksite pay
offs are also assumed to satisfy the usual prisoner's dileirima regularity-condition {L + H)/2 < C,
guaranteeing that mutual'cooperation dominates alternating cooperation and'defection 9n average.
Each agent, whether'a work supplier or an employer;.'Uses a simple learning algorithm.to update
his expected'utility assessments on the basis of new payoff information. Specifically, an,agent v
assigns an exogenously given initial expected utility U° to each potential worksite partner z with
whom he has not yet interacted.'Each time an interaction with z takes place, v forms an updated
expected utility assessriient for 'z hy summing together with all payoffs.-received to date,from
interactions'With z (includingboth worksite payoffs and refusalpayoffs) arid then dividing this sum
by one plus the number of interactions with 'z. • '•
The rule governing the worksite behavior of each agent, whether work'supplier or employer,
is represented as a iiiiite-memory pure strategy, for playing a prisoner's dilemma game with an
arbitrary partner an indefinite,number of times,-hereafter referred, to as a worksite strategy. At the
commencement of each trade cycle loop, agents have no information about the worksite strategies
of other agents; they can only learn about these strategies by engaging other agents in repeated
worksite interactions and observing the behavioral and utility outcomes that ensue. In consequence,
each agent's choice of an action in a current worksite interaction with another agent is determined
entirely on the basis of his own past interactions with this other agent plus his initial expected
utility assessment of the agent. Each agent thus keeps separate track of his interaction historv with
each potential worksite partner.^®
At the end of each trade cycle loop, the utility (fitness) of each work supplier and employer is
measured by the average payoff per trade cycle that he attained during the course of this loop -
that is, by his total net payoff divided by the number of trade cycles constituting the loop. For
employers, total net payoffs equal total net worksite payoffs; for work suppliers, total net payoffs
equal total net worksite payoffs plus the (negative) sum of any incurred refusal payoffs. The worksite
strategies of workers and employers are then separately evolved by means of standardly specified
genetic algorithms involving recombination, mutation, and elitism operations that are biased in
favor ofmore fit agents.^^ This evolution is meant to reflect the formation and transmission of
new ideas by mimicry and experimentation, not reproduction in any biological sense. That is,
if a worksite strategy successfully results in high fitness for an agent of a particular type, then
other agents ofthe same type are led to modify their own strategies to more closely resemble the
successful strategy.
An important caution is in order here, however. The information that work suppliers and
employers are currently permitted to have access to in the evolution step is substantial, namely,
complete knowledge of the collection of strategies used by agents of their own type in the previous
^°The implications of this type of informational assumption in search and match contexts has been explored by
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990). They show that, even in the absence of trading frictions, noncompetitive equilibria
can arise when agent behavior depends on specific information such as the identity of trading partners and personal
histories with trading partners. n • r
"More precisely, for each agent type (work supplier or employer), the genetic algorithm evolves a new collection of
agent worksite strategies from the existing collection of agent worksite strategies by applying the foUowing four steps:
(1) Evaluation, in which afitness score is assigned to each strategy in the existing strategy collection; (2) Recombina
tion in which offspring (new ideas) are constructed by combining the genetic material (structural characteristics) of
pairs of parent strategies chosen from among the most fit strategies in the existing strategy collection; (3) Mutation,
in which additional variations (new ideas) are constructed by mutating the structural characteristics of each offspring
strategy with some small probabUity; and (4) Replacement, in which the most fit (eUte) worksite strategies in the
existing coUection of strategies are retained for the new collection of strategies and the least fit worksite strategies
in the existing strategy collection are replaced with offspring strategies. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999 for a
more detailed discussion of this use of genetic algorithms in the Trade Network Game (TNG), and see Sargent (1993)
for a more general discussion of genetic algorithm design and use in economics.
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trade cycle loop, ranked-by fitness. ^The'evolution^ step is thus more appropriately interpreted as
an iterative stochastic search"'al'gorithm for'determining possible strategy configuration attractora
rather than as a social learning'mechanism per se. The resulting .welfare outcomes will be used
in subsequent work as a'benchmark against which to assess the performance of more realistlcall)
modelled social learning mechanisms. . • .
3. Descriptive Statistics
Each ofthe labor market experiments reported in this study results in a one-to-many mapping be
tween structural characteristics and outcomes due to path dependency effects. That is. when each
particular experimental treatment is repeated for a range of pseudo-random number seed values,
a distribution of network, behavioral, welfare, and market power outcomes is generated. Conse
quently, the mapping between treatment factors and outcomes must be characterized statistically.
This section explains the descriptive statistics that have been constructed to aid in the ex
perimental determination of correlations between treatment factors and network formations, and
between network formations and the types of worksite behaviors, welfare outcomes, and market
i ' t i '
power outcomes that these networks support. Networks depict who is working for whom, and
with what regularity. Worksite behavior refers to the specific actions undertaken bywork suppliers
and employers in their worksite interactions. Welfare refers to the utility levels attained by work
suppliers and employers as a result of job search and worksite interactions. Finally, market power
refers to the ability of work suppliers or employers to secure for themselves an average utility level
that exceeds the level they would attain under competitive market conditions.
3.A Classification of Networks by Distance • ' • . . ,
First introduced is a distance measure on networks that permits the classification ofthese
network into alternative types.-'This distance measure calculates the extent to which an observed
• ^ , 'iPi . • ,
pattern of relationships a,mong work suppliers and employers deviates 'from an idealized pattern
compatible with a competitive (full employment) market outcome.
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All labor market experiments reported in this study are implemented using the Trade Network
Game (TNG) source code developed by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999). Let denote a seed
value for the pseudo-random number generator incorporated in this TNG source code, and let £
denote a potential economy, i.e.. an economy characterized structurally by the TNG source code
together with specific values for all TNG source code parameters^^ apart from 5. The saniph
economy generated from E, given the seed value is denoted by {s,E).
Worksite strategies are represented as finite state machines.hence the actions undertaken
by any agent v in repeated worksite interactions with another agent z must eventually cycle.^"'
Consequently, these actions can be summarized in the form of a worksite history H-.P. where the
handshake His (possibly null) string of worksite actions that form anon-repeated pattern and the
persistent portion f is a (possibly null) string of worksite actions that are cyclically repeated. For
example, letting cdenote cooperation and ddenote defection, the worksite history ddd:dc indicates
that agent Vdefected against agent z in his first three worksite interactions with - and thereafter
alternated between defection and cooperation.
Awork supplier wand employer e are said to exhibit a persistent relationhip during a given
trade cycle loop of a sample economy [s, E) if the following two conditions hold: (a) their worksite
histories with each other during the course of this loop take the form H '^-Pw and He'-Pe with nonnull
Ptu and Pe\ and (b) accepted work offers between wand e do not permanently cease during this
loop either by choice (a permanent switch away to astrictly preferred partner) or by refusal (one
agent becomes intolerable to the other because of too many defections).
Awork supplier or employer that fails to form any persistent relationships during a given
complete annotated listing of these user-supplied TNG source code parameters is given in Section 4, below.
Afinite state machine is asystem comprising afinite coUection of internal states together with astate transition
function that gives the next internal state the system will enter as afunction of the current state and other curren
inputs to the system. For the application at hand, the latter inputs are the actions selected by awork supplier and
an employer engaged in aworksite interaction. See McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999) for amore detailed discussion
and illustration of how finite state machines are used to represent worksite strategies in the
"For the particular parameter values used in this study, the maximum cycle length is 1,024. In the experiment
reported below in Section 5, however, the observed cycle lengths tend to Ue between 1and 7, and the maximum
observed cycle length is only 23.
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trade cycle loop is called persistently inactive. A work supplier in a persistent relationship witli an
employer in a given trade cycle loop is said to be latched to the employer if he works for the employer
continuously (in each successive trade cycle) rather than recurrently (randomly or periodically).
A possible pattern of relationships among the work suppliers and employers in the final gen
eration of a potential economy E is referred to as a network, denoted generically by A(£"). Each
network K{E) is represented in the form of a directed graph in which the vertices \'{E) of the
graph represent the work suppliers and employers, the edges of the graph (directed arrows) rep
resent work offers directed from work' suppliers to employers, and the edge weight on any edge
denotes the number of accepted work offers (contracts) between the work supplier and employer
connected by the edge.
Let K{s^E) denote the network depicting the actual pattern of relationships among the agents
in the final generation of the sample economy {s^E). The reduced form network K^{s,E) derived
from K(s,E) by eliminatirig all edges of A'(5,£^) that correspond to nonpersistent relationships is
referred to as the persisterit network for {s,E).' By construction, any persistently inactive agent
constitutes an isolated' vertex of K^{s', E).
For each potential economy E, let denote the following partially specified relationship
pattern: Each work supplier directs work offers to employers without latching, and no work supplier
or employer is persistently inactive. Let denote the collection of all networks whose edges
conform to the pattern The network class K^(E) \s capable of supporting'competitive
market conditions for E^ in a sense that will be clarified in Section 3.C. Consequently, V°{E) and
K°{E) will henceforth be referred to as the competitive relationship pattern and the competitive
network class for E, respectively. '' ; . •
The distance D°(s,E) between the persistent network K^(s,E) and the competitive network
class K°{E) for a sample economy (5, E) isdefined tobe the number of vertices (agents) in K^(s, E)
whose edges (persistent relationships) fail toconform to the competitive relationship pattern V°(E).
By construction, then, the distance D°{s,E) indicates theextent to which K^{s,E) deviates from
13
the "null hypothesis'^ K^iE) of a competitive market network. More generally, as wiU be seen in
Section 0, the distance measure D° provides a useful way to classify the different types of persistent
networks observed to arise for a given value of £ as the seed value 5 is varied.
3.B Classification of Worksite Behaviors and Utility Outcomes
Let a sample economy {s,E) be given. Awork supplier or employer in the final generation of
is called aggressive.if he engages in at least one defection against another agent that has not
previously defected against him. The 1X2vector giving the percentages of work suppliers and
employers in the final generation of (s, E) that are aggressive is referred to as the aggressive profik
for {s,E}. The aggressive profile measures the extent to which the work suppliers and employers
behave opportunistically in worksite interactions with partners who are strangers^^ or who so far
have been consistently cooperative.
As noted in Section 3.A, a work supplier or employer in the final generation of{s,E) is called
persistently inactive if he constitutes an isolated vertex of the persistent network K^{s,E). The
1x2vector giving the percentages of work suppliers and employers in the final generation of (5, E)
who are persistently inactive is referred to as the p-inactive profile for (s,E). The p-inactive,profile
measures the extent to which the work suppliers and employers fail toestablish any persistent rela
tionships. The p-inactive percentage for work suppliers constitutes their persistent unemployment
rate, and the p-inactive percentage for employers constitutes their persistent vacancy rate.
Awork supplier or employer in the final generation of (s, E) is referred to as a repeat defector if
he establishes at least one persistent relationship for which the persistent portion P of his worksite
history H:P includes a defection d. Defections for work suppUers correspond to worksite shirking
episodes, and defections for employers correspond to the provision of poor working conditions.
The 1x2 vector giving the percentages of work suppliers and employers in the final generation of
{s,E) who are repeat defectors is referred to as the repeat defector profile for {s,E). The repeat
^^The importance of stance toward strangers and first impressions for determining subsequent outcomes in socioe
conomic contexts is stressed by Rabin and Schrag (1999).
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defector profile measures the extent towhich the work suppliers and employers engage in recurrent
or continuous defections. -
Ifa work supplier or employer in the final generation of (s. E) establishes at least one persistent
relationship, and his worksite history for each of'his'persistent relationships has the general form
H:c, he is referred to as* persistently nice. The 1X2vector giving the percentages of work suppliers
and employers in the final generation of (5, E) who are persistently nice is referred, to as the p-nicc
profile for (s, E). The p-nice profile measures-the extent to.which the work suppliers and employejs
establish persistent relationships characterized by. fully cooperative behavior. , ,
By construction, each work-supplier and employer in the final generation of (.s.£) must,either
be a persistently inactive agent, a repeat defector, or a persistently nice agent. . ,
Finally, the vector U{s',-E] - {Uyi{s,'E),Ue{s,E)) •giving the average.utility, (fitness) levels.
Uu,is,E) and Ue{s,E) attziihed by work, suppliers-and employers, respectively,, in the final gen
eration of {s,E) is referred to ^s-ihe.^utility profile ioT-{s,E). The utility profile,t/,(fi,£) measures
the distribution of wdfare" across, agent types. ,
3.C Market Power Measurement
The current study adopts the standard industrial organization approach to the measurement of
market power: namely, market power is measured by the degree to which the actual welfare levels
attained by work suppliers and employers compare against an idealized competitive yardstick. This
competitive yardstick requires absence of strategic behavior, symmetric treatment of equals, and
full employment.
Specifically, given any potential economy E, competitive market conditions z.Te said to hold for E
if the following four conditions are satisfied: (i) Work suppliers and employers behave cooperatively
in all'of their worksite interactions; (ii) each'work'supplier has the same number of accepted work
offers as any other work supplier over the course of each Complete trade cycle loop; !(iii) each
employer has the same number of vacant job openings as any other employer over the course of
15
each complete trade cycle loop; and (iv) full employment obtains in each trade cycle, in the sense
that the ratio of accepted work offers to total potential work offers is as high as possible given the
particular job capacity level specified for E.
These competitive market conditions are idealized conditions thatmay or ma\ not be attained
in any actual'sample economy In the absence of job search costs, however, any network
supporting these four competitive market conditions would have to be in the competitive network
class K°{E). This follows because condition (i) would then imply that work suppliers indifferently
direct their work offers among employers, resulting in recurrent rather than latched relationships,
and the symmetric treatment conditions (ii) and (iii) and the full employment condition (iv) imply
that no work supplier or employer is persistently inactive.
As will be seen in Section 5, the utility profile W{E) = {U^iE), t/;(£:)).that work suppliers and
employers would obtain in any trade cycle loop under competitive market conditions is straight
forward to calculate for each tested potential economy E. For any actual sample economy {s,E)
corresponding to E^ the market power of work suppliers and employers in the final generation of
(s,E) is measured by the extent to which their realized utility profile U{s,E) deviates from U'{E).
Specifically, the market power of work suppliers is measured in percentage terms by
MP^{s,E) = M£lg__Mxioo , (1)
and the market power ofemployers is measured in percentage terms by
MP,{3,E) = . (2)
The vector MP(s,E) = {MP^{s,E),MPe(s,E)) is hereafter referred to as the market power
profile for As will be clarified in Section 5, the market power profUe must be interpeted
with care; for the competitive yardstick used in its construction ignores the fact that organizational




The experiments reported in Section 5are for two-sided labor markets comprising NW work suppli
ers and NE employers. Each work supplier has the same work offer quota, wq. and each employer
has the same acceptance'quota, eg. The experimental design focuses on the independent variaiion
of two factors: jot concentration as measured by JCON ~ NWjNE; and job capacity as measured
by JCAP = {NE•eq)/{NW •wq). As shown in Table 4, ttree settings are tested for each factor
- low, balanced, and high - resulting in a 3 x 3 design matrix comprising a total of nine tested
potential economies ' ' '' •
Insert Table 4 About Here
All remaining parameters are maintained at fixed values throughout all experiments. Table 5
lists these fixed parameter values alongwith specific NW, NE, wq, and eqv^ues yielding a JCON
value equal to 2 and a JCAP value equal to 1.
Insert Table. 5 About Here
For each tested potential economy E, twenty sample economies (;;s,E) were'experimentally
generated using twenty arbitrarily selected seed values s for the pseudo-random number generator
included in the TNG sourcecode.^® Foreachrun s', the persistent network K^(s, E) was'determined
and graphically depicted, and the four behavior^ profiles (aggressive, p-inactive, repeat defector,
p-nice), the utility profile, and the market power profile were determined and recorded. '
The distance D'^{s,E) of K^{s,E) from the competitive network'class K^{E) was then deter
mined for each run s, and a histogram for the distance values D^{s,e) was constructed giving the
percentage of runs s corresponding to each possible distance value. - ' ' '
^®These twenty seed values are as follows: 5,-10, 15, 20,"25, 30, 45, 65, 63, 31, 11-, 64,-41, 66, 13, 54, 641, 413, 425,
and 212. The final fourteen values were determined by random throws of two and three die. The TNG source code
used to implement the labor market framework uses pseudo-random number values in the initialization of worksite
strategies, in the matching process to break ties among equally preferred worksite partners, and in genetic algorithm •
recombination and mutation, operations applied to worksite strategies in the evolution step.
17
5. Experimental Findings
As detailed in Section 1. the primary objective of this study is to test the four hypotheses Hl-
H4 regarding the ability of work suppliers and employers to exercise market power under various
job capacity and job concentration conditions. Hypotheses Hi and H3 roughly stale that work
suppliers do better (and relatively better than employers) in terms of exercising market power as
job capacity is increased, and hypotheses H2 and H4 roughly state that employers do better (and
relatively better than work suppliers) in terms of exercising market power as job concentration
is increased. Aggregate market power findings are reported first, followed by a report on market
power findings at a more disaggregated level.
5.1 Aggregate Market Power Findings
Recall the market powermeasures MP^^,{syE) and MP^^s^E) for work suppliers and employers
defined by relations (1) and (2) in Section 3.C for any sample economy (5,£I). By construction,
these measures are positively valued if and only if the actual utility levels and Ue{s,E]
attained by work suppliers and employers - which include an accounting for organizational costs -
exceed idealized competitive utility levels U^(E) and Vl(E) for which no such accounting is taken.
More precisely, as will be seen below, the competitive utility levels ignore three types of or
ganizational costs that can significantly affect the actual utility levels attained by work suppliers
and employers in any sample economy: (i) Search and inactivity sunk costs incurred during the
process of establishing a persistent network of relationships; (ii) search and inactivity variable costs
incurred in the process of maintaining a persistent network of relationships; and (iii) utility losses
(negative payoffs) incurred when worksite partners defect. Even if the competitive utility levels are
ultimately attained in a steady state sense, the sunk costs associated with attaining this compet
itive state will ensure that the actual utility levels attained by work suppliers and eniployers are
lower than the competitive utility levels.
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that the experimentally determined values for
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the market power measures (1) and (2)'. aggregated across the twenty s^ple economiei; for each of
the nine tested potential economies, were found to be negatively valued m.all but two cases, The^e
aggregate market power outcomes, reported in Table 6, suggest that it is not possible in general to
infer the relative ability of work suppliers and employers to exercise market .power under ahernalive
structural conditions simply by examining the signs of these conventional market power measures.
Rather, for such a determination, attention must be paid to their relative values.
Insert Table 6 About Here.
The key implication of the aggregate market power outcomes reported in Table 6is that job
capacity is the dominant factor determining relative market power. Specifically, these outcomes
provide strong support for the job capacity hypotheses HI and H3(a) and weak support for the job
capacity hypothesis H3{b). Regarding the latter, H3(b) fails to hold as job capacity is increased
irom tight to balanced but does hold as job capacity is further increased from balanced to excess.
On the other hand, these outcomes do not support the job concentration hypotheses H2 and H4.
The following sections seek abetter understanding of these market power findings by examining
the experimental data at a more disaggregated level.
5.2 Disaggregated Market Power Findings for High Job Concentration
Detailed experimental findings for high job concentration {JCON = 2) and job capacity JCAP
varying from tight to excess are reported in Table 7. For reasons clarified below, these findings
generally support the job capacity hypotheses HI and H3, and this support is particularly strong
when attention is restricted to dominant distance clusters. On the other hand, these findings
strongly contradict the job concentration,hypothesis H2(a) under conditions ofexcess job capacity.
Insert Table 7 About Here
Consider, first, the potential economy E characterized by high job concentration (JC0N=2)
and tight job" capacity {JCAP=\I2). As shown in Table 4, for this E there are twelve work
19
suppliers who each control one work offer and six employers who each control one job opening,
hence job openings are concentrated in the hands of relatively few employers. Moreover, there are
two potential work offers for each potential job opening, hence work suppliers face a high structural
risk ofunemployment. The utility levels that would be attained by work suppliers and employers
over the course of a trade cycle loop for this E under competitive market conditions are given by
the competitive utility profile ?7"(£) = (0.70,1.40). '^
According to hypotheses Hl(a) and H2(a), work suppliers should be disadvantaged relative to
employers in this potential economy E regarding their ability to exercise market power. Experi
mental findings for the twenty sample economies [s^E) run for this E are reported in Table 7(a).
As seen, these sample economies can bepartitioned into three distinct distance {D°) clusters sup
porting three distinct types of behavioral and utility outcomes.^® In each distant cluster, however,
the mean market power level attained by. work suppliers is lower than the mean market power level
attained by employers as predicted by hypotheses Hl(a) andH2(a).
Thedistance cluster 0-7 in Table 7(a) includes 25% ofthe twenty sample economies run for this
potential economy E. By definition of the distance mea:sure D", these are the sample economies
whose persistent networks are closest to the competitive network class A®(£'). Indeed, the persis
tent networks that evolve for this distance cluster are largely recurrent in form, and the worksite
behaviors supported by these persistent networks are largely p-nice (persistently cooperative).
'^This determination of U'{E) results from the following considerations. Given the structural conditions defining
the potential economy E with JC0N=2 and JCAP=l/2 (see Table 4), together with the competitive market
conditions set out in Section 3.C, each of the twelve work suppUers engages in one worksite interaction in 75 of
the 150 trade cycles constituting a trade cycle loop, each of the six employers engaps in one worksite interaction
in each of the 150 trade cycles constituting a trade cycle loop, and each worksite interaction is characterized by
mutually cooperative behavior vrith mutual cooperation payoffs of (1.40,1.40) for the work supplier and employer.
Consequently, recalling that the utility level attuned by an agent over the course of any trade cycle loop is defined
to be his average (per trade cycle) payoff, the utility level attained by each work supplier over the course of a trade
cycle loop is equal to 0.70 = 1.40/2, and the utility level attained by each employer over the course of a trade cycle
loop is equal to 1.40. . r v
"For each distance cluster, the mean and standard deviation are reported for each component of the three be-
havioral profiles (aggressive, p-inactive, p-nice), the utility profile, and the market power profile across ^1 of the
sample runs 5that lie in this distance cluster. By construction (see Section 3.B), the components of the ^inactive,
repeat defector, and p-nice profiles corresponding to each agent type must sum to 100 percent since each agent^is
amember of one and only one of these three behavioral categories. Since the repeat defector profiles can be
inferred from the reported p-inactive and p-nice profiles, they are omitted to conserve space. Asimilar remark holds
for all remaining distance cluster results reported in Table 7and in subsequent tables.
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The frequent p-nice behavior exhibited by employed work suppliers in distance cluster 0-7 is
consistent with efficiency-wage theory, which predicts that high job search costs should discourage
shirking (worksite defections). Given tight job capacity (JCAP=l/2). at most half ofall potential
work offers can be accepted at any given time. Any work supplier fired for shirking can thus expect
to incur high job search costs (negative refusal payoffs) as he attempts to secure new employnienl.
I
Indeed, as seen in Table 7(a), 40% of the work suppliers in distance cluster 0-7 are ultimately
p-inactive (unemployed). These work suppliers become so discouraged by the high job search costs
they incur in their attempts to secure employment that the expected utility they assign to each
employer eventually becomes negative, discouraging any further work offers. In addition to the
opportunity costs incurred by unemployed work suppliers, the recurrent form of the persistent
networks in this distance cluster implies that employed work suppliers incur variable job search
costs in the process of maintaining these networks! The mean utility level 0.48 attained by work
suppliers in this "competitive" distance cluster is therefore markedly lower than the competitive
utility level 0.70, resulting in a low mean market power level of -32% for work suppliers.
In contrast, the mean utility level 1.35 attained by employers in distance cluster 0-7 is close
to their competitive utility level 1.40, hence their mean market power is close to 0. The question
then arises whether employers could do even better if they took advantage of the weak structural
position of work suppliers by more frequent defections.
The next distance cluster 10-13 reported in Table 7(a), comprising 45% of the sample economies
for this reveals that employers can indeed do better on average by engaging in more aggressive
behavior in their initiial worksite relationships arid more repeat defection behavior in their persistent
worksite relationships. As depicted in Figure 1(b), the typical persistent' network that evolves in
this dominant distance cluster consists of six disjoint pairs of work suppliers'and employers in
persistent latched relationships together with six p-inactive work suppliers: The mean utility and
market power levels attained by work suppliers in this dominant distance cluster are smaller than
the levels they attained in distance cluster 0-7; the costs of increased employer defection rates and
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an increased unemployment rate outweigh on average the benefits of reduced variable search costs
due to the latched nature of the persistent networks. On the other hand, the mean utility and
market power levels attained by employers are markedly higher.
Insert Figure 1 About Here
Nevertheless, the final distance cluster 15-18 reported in Table 7(a), comprising 30% of the
sample economies for this E, cautions that too determined an effort byemployers to exercise market
power through aggression and repeat defections can be self-defeating. Work suppliers interacting
with strongly aggressive and predacious employers tend to evolve worksite behavioral rules that are
aggressive and predacious in turn, whatever their structural situation. Indeed, in distance cluster
15-18, worksite interactions come to be dominated by mutual defection behavior, which leads to
quits and firings. Note that 90% of the work suppliers and 81% of the employers in this distance
cluster ultimately become p-inactive. This widespread coordination failure dramatically decreases
the mean utility and market power levels attained by work suppliers and employers alike.
In short, the results reported in Table 7(a) provide strong support for hypotheses Hl(a) and
H2(a); employers are advantaged relative to work suppliers with regard to their ability to exercise
market power in conditions of high job concentration and tight job capacity. Yet a closer exami
nation of the data reveals that the mobility and behavioral flexibility (provocability) of the work
suppliers provides them with some degree ofprotection against exploitive behavior by employers.
Consider, next, a potential economy E for which job concentration remains high {JC0N=2)
but job capacity increases from tight to balanced [JCAP=1), so that the total number ofpotential
job openings is just equal to the total number of potential work offers. Specifically, referring to
Table 4, twelve work suppliers each control one work offer and six employers each control two job
openings. Thus, work suppliers no longer face a structural risk of unemployment due to capacity
constraints. The utility levels that would be attained by work suppliers and employers over the
course of a trade cycle loop for this E under competitive market conditions are given by the
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competitive utility profile U'{E) = (1.40.2.80). '
Hypotheses Hl(a)'and H2(a,) predict that work suppliers will.be disadvaiUaged relatiye lo
employers in this potential economy E. Work suppliers must incur job search costs despite b^anced
job capacity and, in addition, jobs are concentrated in the hands of relatively few employers. Indeed,
in each of the three distant clusters reported in Table 7(b) for this E, the mean market power level
attained by work suppliers is lower than the mean'inarket power level attained by employers.
In particular, the Table 7(b) findings reveal that'80% of the sample economies observed for
this E lie'in a distance cluster D°=12. As depicted in Figure 1(c), the persistent networks that
evolve for this dominant distance cluster all take the form of'disjoint triads comprising two work
suppliers latched to a single employer, with almost all'agents.expressing p-nice worksite behaviors.
Thelatchednature of these persistent networks means^that work suppliers avoid variable job search,
costs, although they still incur sunk job search costs in the process of forming these networks.
Finally, consider what happens'when job concentration remains high {J,C0N=2) but job ca
pacity further increases from balanced to excess (</CAP=2). Referring to Table 4, for this potential
economy .E twelve work suppliers each control one work offer and six employers each control four
job openings. Consequently, there are two job openings for every potential,work offer, implying
that employers face a high structural risk'of vacancy. The utility levels that, would be attained by
work suppliers and employers over the-course of a'trade cycle loop for,this under competitive,
market conditions are given by tHe competitive utility iprofile —•(l;40i2.,8D). .
As seen in Table 7(c), 25% of the sample economies for this E lie in a distance cluster 0-5 close
to the competitive network class (i?°=0). The persistent networks that evolve for these sample
economies are largely recurrent in form, and the large majority of work suppliers and employers
'' I • I ; ,
are p-nice. Nevertheless, 25% of the work suppliers are aggressive in their initial interactions with
employers, and this gives them an edge over employers in terms of their attained market power.
Thus, hypothesis Hl(b) is supported and hypothesis H2(a) is contradicted in this distance cluster.
Table 7(c) also shows that the remaining 75% of the sample economies observed for this E lie
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in a distance cluster 12-14. As depicted in Figure l{d). the typical persistent network that evolves
in this dominMt distance cluster consists of disjoint components comprising from one to four work
suppliers latched to asingle employer who engage in frequent defections against this employer. Note
that 93% of the work suppliers in this dominant distance cluster are aggressive and 767c engage in
repeat defections. While some employers respond by evolving aggressive and/or repeal defection
behavior themselves, work suppliers still do markedly better than employers on average in terms
of exercising market power, attaining a mean market power level of +9% in comparison with only
-55% for employers. Consequently, in this dominant distance cluster, hypothesis Hl(b) is strongly
supported and hypothesis H2(a) is strongly contradicted.
Recall from Section 5.1 that the aggregate market power outcomes reported in Table 6 indicate
a violation ofthe job capacity sensitivity hypothesis H3 under conditions ofhigh job concentration.
Specifically, in contradiction to the prediction of H3(b), employers on average do not experience a
decline in their ability to exercise market power as job capacity increases from tight to balanced..
The disaggregated findings reported in Table 7 show this is a misleading conclusion. Omitting
the relatively small number of sample economies in Table 7(a) for which widespread coordination
failure occurs and both agent types do extremely poorly - i.e., distance cluster 15-18 in Table 7(a)
- hypothesis H3 is actually strongly supported as job capacity increases from tight to balanced.
This pooling problem is indicated in Table 6by the high standard deviations for the mean, market
power levels attained by work suppliers and employers under conditions of high job concentration
and tight job capacity.
5.3 Disaggregated Market Power Findings for Balanced Job Concentration
Detailed experimental findings for balanced job concentration {JCON=l) and job capacity
JCAP varying from tight to excess are reported in Table 8. For reasons explained below, these
findings generally support the job capacity hypotheses HI and H3, and this support is particu
larly strong when attention is restricted to dominant distance clusters. In contrast, these findings
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strongly contradict the relative job concentration hypothesis H2(a) under conditions of excess job
capacity and the job concentration sensitivity hypothesis H4(a) under conditions of balanced job
capacity.
Insert Table 8 About Here
Consider the potential economy E characterized bjr balanced job concentration {JCO.\ =\)
and tight job capacity. iJCAP=l/2). Referring to Table 4. for this E there are twelve work
suppliers who each control two work offers and twelve employers who each control one job opening.
Thus, although job concentration is balanced, two potential work offers exist for each potential job
opening, implying that work suppliers face a high structural risk of unemployment. The utilit\
levels that would beattained by work suppliers and employers over the course ofa trade cycle loop
for this E under competitive market conditions are given by the competitive utility profile I (£*)
= (1.40,1.40).
As indicated inTable 8(a), the,sample economies observed for this E lie in three distinct distance
clusters. In each cluster, employers attain a markedly higher mean market power level than work
suppliers. Consequently, hypotheses Hl(a) and H2(a) are strongly supported.
In particular, Table 8(a) shows that 55% of the sample economies observed for this E lie in
a distance cluster 1-7. As depicted in Figure 2(b), .the typical persistent network that evolves
in this dominant distance cluster is a recurrent network that supports p-nice worksite behaviors
by both work suppliers and employers. Nevertheless, 23% of the work suppliers in this dominant
distance cluster become p-inactive (unemployed) primarily due to bad luck. More precisely, these
work suppliers incur high job search costs by chance,, as employers are forced to refuse work offers
from cooperative work suppliers because of job capacity limitations. These high job search costs
ultimately lead the wprk suppliers to associate a negative expected utility with each potential
employer, which discourages them from making any further work offers.
Insert Figure 2 'Abbut Here
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The question again arises whether employers could take better advantage ofthe relatively weak
structural situation of work suppliers facing tight job capacity by engaging in more aggressive and
predacious worksite behavior. The answer, again, is a qualified yes.
The next distance cluster 12-14 reported in Table 8(a) comprises 20% of the remaining sample
economies for this E. Employers in this secondary distance cluster are much more aggessivo in
their initial worksite relationships and less cooperative in their persistent worksite relationships,
as indicated by their 75% aggressive percentage and their 50% p-nice percentage. Work suppliers
retaliate by being less cooperative in turn, which results in increased firings and an increased
unemployment (p-inactivity) rate of 38%. The persistent networks that evolve are now latched
rather than recurrent in form - each work supplier is either p-inactive or latched to one or two
employers —which reduces variable job search costs for employed work suppliers. For work suppliers,
these changes balance out, leaving them with mean utility and market power levels that differ little
from the levels they attained in the dominant distance cluster 1-7. In contrast, employers manage
to secure a small increase in their mean utility and market power levels.
On the other hand, the final distance cluster D°=24 in Table 8(a), comprising the remaining
25% of the sample economies for this E, illustrates the risk faced by employers when they attempt
to exploit their structural advantage too vigorously. In this distance cluster, work suppliers retaliate
strongly against initial and repeated defections by employers, resulting in theevolution of such ag
gressive and predacious worksite strategies on the part of all agents that no persistent relationships
form. This complete coordination failure is evidenced by the 100% p-inactivity (unemployment
and vacancy) rates reported for work suppliers and employers.
Consider, next, apotential economy Efor which job concentration remains balanced (JCON^l)
but job capacity increases from tight to balanced {JCAP=1), implying that neither agent type is
disadvantaged by job concentration or job capacity conditions per se. Referring to Table 4, for this
E there are twelve work suppliers who each control one work offer and twelve employers who each
control one job opening. The utility levels that would be attained by work suppliers and employers
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over the course of a trade cycle loop for this £ under competitive market conditions are given by
the competitive utility profile = (1.40.1.40).
Table 8(b) shows that 70% of the sample economies observed for this E lie in a distance clusier
r®=12. As depicted in Figure 2(c), the persistent networks that evolve in this dominant disiancr
cluster all consist of disjoint latched pairings of work suppliers and employers exhibiting largely
p-nice worksite behavior. In addition, asingle sample economy .wa5 observed at distance £)^=1with
a completely recurrent persistent network and 100% p-nice behavior., Work suppliers do relative)}
poorly in this outlier sample economy because of high job search costs. The remaining loYo ol
the sample economies observed for this lie in a distance cluster 13-15 ,with persistent networks
consisting of mixtures of p-inactive agents and latched pairings of work suppliers and employers
predominantly exhibiting repeat defection behavior.
Hypotheses Hl(a) and H2{a) predict for this E that work suppliers should be disadvantaged
relative to employers in terms of their ability .to exercise market power; for, despite balanced job
concentration and job capacity conditions, work suppliers bear the brunt of job search costs in
the form of refusal payoffs. The findings in Table 8(b) show that this prediction is accurate for
the dominant distance cluster D°=12 containing 70% lof the sample, economies, and also for the
single sample economy in distance cluster D^—\\ However, in the remaining distance cluster 13-15
containing 25% ofthe sample economies, work suppliers attain a slightly higher mean market power
measure than employers.
Finally, consider a potential economy E for which jobconcentration, remains balanced (JCON—\)
but job capacity increases from.balanced to excess (JCAP=2). As indicatedin Table,4, twelve work
suppliers each' control one workiofFer and twelve employers each control two_ work offers, implying
that employers face a high structural risk-of vacancy. The.utility levels that would ,be attained by
work suppliers and employers over the course of a trade cycle loop,for this under competitive
market conditions are given by the competitive utility profile U*{E) = (1.40,1.40).
Hypothesis Hl(b) predicts that work suppliers should do better than employers,in this E,
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whereas hypothesis H2(a) predicts that work suppliers should do worse. The findings reported m
Table 8(c) generally support Hl(b), and this support is strong for the sample economies in the
dominant distance cluster. Consequently, H2(a) is strongly contradicted.
Specifially, Table 8(c) shows that 70% of the sample economies observed for this E.We in a
distance cluster 14-17.. As depicted in Figure 2(d), the typical persistent network that evolves in
thisdominant distance clusteris a mixture ofp-inactive employers and disjoint latched groupings in
which one or two work suppliers are latched to a single employer. Work suppliers are predominantly
repeat defectors whereas most employers are p-nice. The mean market power level attained by work
suppliers is +26% whereas the mean power level attained by employers is only -56%.
The remaining sample economies for this E lie in secondary distance clusters 4-6 and ^^=0.
The persistent networks that evolve in distance cluster 4-6 are mixtures of recurrent and latched
relationships, and work suppliers and employers exhibit largely p-nice worksite behaviors and attain
similar mean market power levels; the slightly lower level attained by work suppliers, is primarily
due to job search costs. For the single sample economy in the "competitive" distance cluster Z)°=0,
the persistent network is entirely recurrent and all employers are p-nice. However, aggressive and
repeat defector behavior on the part of a small number of work suppliers results in work suppliers
attaining a higher'mean market-power level than employers, despite job search costs.
According to the job capacity sensitivity hypothesis H3, work suppliers should be increasingly
better off and employers increasingly worse off as job capacity varies from tight to excess, given
a fixed balanced job concentration level. Omitting the single sample economy observed to lie in
distance cluster £>"=1 in Table 8(b) - for which the persistent network is recurrent, all behavior
is p-nice, and workers attain a low mean power level of -68% due to high job search costs -
hypothesis H3(a) is strongly supported. Also, omitting outlier sapiple economies in Table 8(a) for
which coordination failure is widespread and both agent types do exceedingly poorly - i.e., distance
cluster D°=24 in Table 8(a) - hypothesis H3(b) is strongly supported a£ well.
Recall that the aggregate market power outcomes reported in Table 6indicate that hypothesis
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H3(b) is violated as one moves from tight to balanced job capacity, keeping job concentration
balanced, for employers are not worse off on average. The disaggregated data outcomes mTable ^
now show this to be a misleading inference arising from inappropriate data pooling. This pooling
problem is indicated in Table 6by the high standard deviations for the mean market power levels
attained by work suppliers and employers under conditions of balanced job concentration and tight
job capacity.
Finally, the job concentration sensitivity hypothesis H4 predicts that work suppliers should be
better off and employers worse off operating under conditions of balanced job concentration, as
reported in Table 8, than work suppliers and employers operating under conditions of high job
concentration as reported in Table 7, for any given job capacity level. The 'findings reported in
Table 7 and Table 8 provide weak support for hypothesis H4 under conditions of tight or excess
job capacity, and for hypothesis H4(b) under conditions of balanced job capacity, in the sense that
these hypotheses hold when attention is restricted to' dominant distance clusters. On the other
hand, H4(a) is not even weakly supported under conditions of balanced job capacity. Specifically,
restricting attention to the dominant distance clusters D°=12 in Table 7(b) and Table 8(b), work
suppliers are actually worse off as job concentration is decreased from high to balanced. The latter
outcome is due to the higher frequencies of repeat defection behavior on the part of both work
suppliers and employers in the balanced job concentration case.
5.4 Disaggregated Market Power Findings for Low Job Concentration
Detailed experimental findings forlow job concentration {JC0N=l/2) and job capacity JCAP
varying from tight to excess axe reported in Table 9. For reasons explained' below, these findings
generally support the job capacity hypotheses Hl aiid H3,-and the support for HI and H3(a) is
particularly strong when attention is restricted 'tb dominant distaiice clusters. 'In contrast, these
findings strongly contradict the relative job'concentratibn "hypothesis H2(b) under conditions.of
tight or balanced job capacity arid"the job concentration''sensitivity hypothesis"H4 under all job
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capacity conditions.
Insert Table 9 About Here
Consider, first, the potential economy E characterized by low job concentration (JCOA =1/2)
and tight job capacity (JCAP=l/2). Referring to Table 4, for this E there are six work suppliers
who each control four work offers and twelve employers who each control one job opening. Work
offers are thus concentratedin the hands ofrelatively few work suppliers; but there are two potential
work offers for each potential job opening, implying that work suppliers face a high structural risk
of unemployment. The utility levels that would be attained by work suppliers and employers over
the course of a trade cycle loop for this E under competitive market conditions are given by the
competitive utility profile U*{E) = (2.8,1.40).
Table 9(a) shows that 50% of the sample economies for this potential economy E lie in distance
cluster 1-4. As depicted in Figure 3(b), the typical persistent network that evolves in this domi
nant distance cluster is a recurrent network that supports p-nice worksite behaviors by both work
suppHers and employers. Nevertheless, 7% of the work suppliers in this dominant distance cluster
become p-inactiye (unemployed) due to high job search costs incurred by chance, and variable job
search costs are high as well. The result is that the -40% mean market power level attained by
work suppliers is much lower than the 0% mean market power level attained by employers, which
supports hypothesis Hl(a) and contradicts hypothesis H2(b).
Insert Figure 3 About Here
The distance cluster 6-16 in Table 9(a) comprises 35% ofthe remaining sample economies for
this E. Work suppliers and employers in this secondary distance cluster are much more aggressive m
their initial worksite relationships and far less cooperative in their persistent worksite relationships,
as indicated by the aggressive and p-nice profiles reported for this distance cluster in Table 9(a).
The persistent networks that evolve are now mixtures of p-inactive agents and latched groupings in
which each work supplier is either p-inactive or in alatched relationship with from one through four
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employers. The latched nature of these networks reduces variable job search costs for employed work
suppliers. Nevertheless, due to increased defection frequencies leading to mutual defection worksite
behavior, quits, and firings, both work suppliers and employers in this secondary distance cluster
are much worse off than the work suppliers and employers in the dominant distance cluhier. Tlic
—78% mean market power level attained .by work suppliers is lower than the,—42% mean market
power level attained by employers, implying that hypothesis Hl(a) is,supported and hypothesis
H2(b) is contradicted.
The final distance cluster i?°=18 in.Table 9(a) comprises the remaining 15% of the sample
economies for this E. In this tertiary distance cluster, work suppliers and employers both evolve
such aggressive and predacious worksite strategies that no persistent relationships form. This
complete coordination failure is^evidenced by,the 100% p-inactivity (unemployment and vacanc>)
rates reported for work suppliers and employers. Although work suppliers attain a sUghtly higher
mean market power level than employers, both levels -are so exceedingly low that this small difference
is inconsequential. ^ .
Consider, next,, a potential economy E for whichgob, concentration remains low {JC0N=\/2)
but job capacity increases from tight to balanced (JCAP=1), implying that work suppliers no
longer face a structural*risk ofunemployment. Referring to Table 4, for this E there are six work
suppliers who each control two work oflFers and twelve employers who each control one job opening.
The utility levels that would beattained by work suppliers and employers over the course ofa trade
cycle loop for this E under competitive market conditions are given by thecompetitive utility profile
U'{E) = (2.80,1.40). i .
As Table 9(b) indicates, an outlier sample economy was observed for this potential economy E in
distance cluster jD®=1. The persistent network for this outlier is recurrent. Consequently, although
worksite behaviors are largely p-nice, the variable,job search costs incurred by work suppliers in
the process of maintaining the persistent network are so high that work suppliers end up with a
mean market power level of only -68%. Since employers attain a -1% mean market power level,
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hypothesis Hl(a) is supported and hypothesis H2(b) is contradicted.
Table 9(b) shows that 80% ofthe sample economies observed for this E lie in a distance cluster
D°=6. As depicted in Figure 3(c), the persistent network that consistently evolves for each sample
economy in this dominant distance cluster is a collection ofdisjoint latched groupings each consisting
of one work supplier latched to two employers. Employers tend to be more aggressive than work
suppliers in their initial worksite relationships, and a significant portion ofboth work suppliers and
employers end up exhibiting repeat defection behavior in their persistent worksite relationships. The
-14% mean market power level attained by work suppliers is lower than the -10% mean market
power level attained by employers, implying that hypothesis Hl(a) is supported and hypothesis
H2(b) is contradicted.
Table 9(b) also shows that the remaining 15% of the sample economies observed for this E lie
in a distance cluster 7-8. The persistent networks that evolve in this secondary distance cluster are
mixtures of p-inactive agents and disjoint latched groupings each consisting of one work supplier
latched to two employers. Both agent types are more aggressive in this secondary distance cluster
than in the dominant distance cluster, and employers in particular engage in much more frequent
repeat defection worksite behavior. This in turn encourages more frequent quits by work suppliers,
resulting in increased p-inactivity rates for both work suppliers and employers that decreases the
mean market power levels attained by both agent types in comparison with the dominant distance
cluster. Since the -38%mean market power level attained by work suppliers is lower than the -14%
mean market power level attained by employers, hypothesis Hl(a) is supported and hypothesis
H2(b) is contradicted.
Finally, consider a potential economy E for which job concentration remains low {JC0N=l/2)
but job capacity increases from balanced to excess {JCAP=2). For this E, as indicated in Table 4,
six work suppliers each control one work offer and twelve employers each control one job opening,
implying that employers face a high structural risk of vacancy. The utility levels that would be
attained by work suppliers and employers over the course of a trade cycle loop for this E under
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competitive market conditions are given by the competitive utility profile Vi.E).= (1.40.0.T0).
Table 9(c) shows that 45% of the sample economies observed for this Elie madistance cluster
D''=12. As depicted in Figure 3(d). the persistent network that evolves in each sample economy in
this dominant distance cluster consists of six p-inactive employers and six disjoint latched pairing;,
comprising awork supplier and an employer. Work suppliers are. 100% aggressive, and most work
suppliers and employers exhibit repeat defection worksite behaviors. The mean market power level
attained by work suppliers is +7% whereas the mean power level attained by employers is only
—45%, hence hypotheses Hl(b) and H2(b) are both supported.
The remaining sample economies for this E Ue in secondary distance clusters 0-4 and ^"=13.
The persistent networks that evolve in the distance cluster 0-4 are mixtures of recurrent and latched
relationships. Work suppliers and employers are 100% p-nice and attain similar mean market power
levels; the slightly lower level attained by work suppliers is due to job search costs mcurred by
chance. In distance'cluster the persistent network that evolves in each sample economy
consists of one p-inactive work supplier, seven p-inactive employers, and five disjoint latched pairings
comprising a work supplier and an employer. Work suppliers are 100% aggressive and employers
are 67% aggressive, and most agents exhibit repeat defection worksite behaviors. The -16% mean
market power level attained by work suppliers is higher than the'—51% mean market power level
attained by employers, hence hypotheses Hl(b) and H2(b) are supported.
According to the job capacity sensitivity hypothesis HS; work suppliers should be increasingly
better off and employers increasingly worse off as job cap^ity varies from tight to excess, given
a low balanced job concentration level. Hypothesis H3(a) is strongly supported' by the findings
in Table 9, and hypothesis H3(b) is generally supported. As in the previous two' sections, the
apparently major violation ofhypoth'esis H3(b) indicated bythe aggregate market power outcomes
for employers reported iiiTable 6asone moves from tight to balanced jobcapacity under conditions
oflow job concentration arises from a pooling problem: the inclusion in Table 9(a) of a relatively
small distance cluster D^=18 in which coordination failure is widespread and both agent types
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attain exceedingly low mean market power levels. Here, however, the violation is not completely
eliminated by removing this outlier distance cluster.
Finally, the job concentration sensitivity hypothesis H4 predicts that work suppliers should
be better off and employers worse off operating under conditions of low job concentration, as
reported in Table 9, than work suppliers and employers operating under conditions of balanced
job concentration as reported in Table 8, for any given job capacity level. The findings reported
in Table 8 and Table 9 do not support hypthesis H4, even if attention's restricted to dominant
distant clusters. Indeed, for each given job capacity level, work suppliers in the dominant distant
clusters actually do worse .as job concentration is decreased from balanced to low whereas employers
generally do better.
6. Concluding Remarks
As shown in previous sections, the aggregate market power findings of this study indicate that job
capacity generally has the hypothesized HI and H3 effects: all else equal, increased job capacity
increases the market power of work suppliers and reduces the market power of employers both
in absolute and relative terms. Disaggregated market power findings reveal that these effects are
particularly strong and clear when attention is focused on the most commonly observed network
formations for each treatment setting. In contrast, neither aggregated nor disaggregated market
power findings provide much support for the job concentration hypotheses H2 and H4. To the
contrary, controlling for job capacity, the effects ofjob concentration on the ability ofwork suppliers
and employers to exercise market power are surprisingly small and unsystematic.
Hypotheses H2 and H4 seem a priori intuitive on the grounds that concentrating work offers in
fewer work supplier hands should provide work suppliers with an increased opportunity to exercise
monopoly power, and concentrating job openings in fewer employer hands should provide employers
wth an increased opportunity to exercise monopsomst power. On the other hand, it may be that
too much concentration lessens the ability of work suppliers or employers as a whole to adapt
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their worksite strategies in a flexible manner in response to the worksite strategies used by their
worksite partners. In genetic algorithm terminology, there may be too little "genetic diversity
in the pool of worksite strategies used by the concentrated agent type for evolutionary selection
pressures to efficiently act upon.- To.test this inflexibility hypothesis, it will be necessary to introduce
the absolute numbers of work ^suppliers,and employers as, treatment factors in addition to their
concentration ratio.
Further work is needed to^test the-robustness of the findings of this study to variations in the
scope and range of other parameter specifications as well. As preliminary as these findings may be.
however, they do caution against the common practice of confounding capacity and concentration
effects in market power studies by letting these two factors vary together in an uncontrolled manner.
A potentially important by-product of the current study is a better understanding of the fun
damental role played by organizational costs in sculpting and sustaining network formations and
hence in determining the welfare,and market power, levels attainable, by work suppliers and em
ployers. For example, when job^capacity is tight, high job search costs can result in widespread
worker discouragement and exit from the labor force that ends up hurting employers as well as
work suppliers. Consequently, although, tight job capacity tends to favor employers, it also in
creases the risk of network coordination failure. Organizational costs are a key focus of researchers
in transactions costs economics - see,;for example, WiUiamson and Marsten (1999). Nevertheless,
the significant problems posed by network organizational costs for the definition and measurement
of market power have not received much attention to date.
A second potentially important by-product of the..current study is a,better appreciation of the
role played by behavioral flexibility in protecting agents against the exercise of ma-rket power by
other agents. .In the labor market framework,, work-suppliers and employers repeatedly choose and
refuse their worksite partners and evolve their worksite behaviors over time. Thus, even when jobs
are in excess supply, attempts by work suppliers to exert market power by repeatedly defecting in
worksite interactions can provoke retaliatory defections by employers as well as firings (refusals of
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all future work offers from offending work suppliers). Similarly, even when jobs are tight, attempts
by employers to exert market power by repeatedly defecting in worksite interactions can provoke
retaliatory defections by work suppliers as well as quits (work suppliers redirecting future work
offers elsewhere). Consequently, although structural asymmetries tend to favor one agent type over
another, attempts by the favored agent type to exploit this advantage increase the riskofbehavioral
coordination failure.
In summary, agent-based computational frameworks suchas the labor market framework used in
this study permit the systematic experimental investigation of behavioral and network formation
processes that appear critical for understanding the relation between structure, behavior, and
market power in real-world labor markets.
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Market protocols for communicatiiig with other agents:
Market protocols for job search and matching;
Market protocols for worksite interactions;
Internally Stored State Information:
My attributes;
My endowments;
My beliefs and preferences;
Addresses I have for myself and for other agents;
Additional data I have about other agents.
Internal Behavioral Rules:
My rules for gathering and processing new information;
My rules for determining my worksite behavior;
My rules for updating my behefs and preferences;
My rules for measuring my utihty (fitness) level;
My rules for modifying my rules.
Table 1: General Form of the Internal Structure of an Agent
int main () {
InitiateEconomy():
For {G = 1 GMax) {
InitiateGen();









// Construct initial subpopulaiions of
// work suppliers and employers with
// random worksite strategies.
// ENTER THE GENERATION CYCLE LOOP
jI GENERATION CYCLE:
II Configure work suppliers and employers
// with user-supplied parameter values
// (initial expected utility levels, work offer
// quotas, employer acceptance quotas....)
// Enter the Trade Cycle Loop
II Trade Cycle:
// Work suppliers and employers determine
// their worksite partners, given
11 their expected utility assessments.
// and record job search and
// inactivity costs.
// Work suppliers and employers engage
// " in worksite interactions and
// record their worksite payoffs.
// Work suppliers and employers update their
// expected utility assessments, using
r /./ newly recorded.costs and worksite
// . payoffs, and be^n a new trade cycle.
4 \
II Environment Step:
II Work suppliers and employers
// assess their utility levels.
// Evolution Step:
II Worksite strategies of work suppliers and
// employers are separately evolved, and
// a new generation cycle begins.







Table 3: Payoff Matrix for the































Table 4: Two-Factor Experimental Design
Job Concentration (JCON = NW/NE) versus
Job Capacity (JCAP = [NE-eq]/[NW-wq]).
// PARAMETER VALUES HELD
GMax = 50 11
IMax = 150 11
ReftisalPayoff = -0.5 //
InactivityPayofF = +0.0 //
Sucker = -1.6 //
BothDefect = -0.6 //
BothCoop = +1,4 " //
Temptation = +3.4 //
InitExpPayoff = +1.4 //
Elite = 67 //
MutationRate = .005 //
FsmStates = 16 //
FsmMemory = 1 //
FIXED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
Total number of generations.
Number of trade cycles per trade cycle loop.
Payoff R received by a refused agent.
Payoff received by an inactive agent.
Lowest possible worksite payoff, L.
Mutual defection worksite payoff, D.
Mutual cooperation worksite payoff, C.
Highest possible worksite payoff, H.
Initial expected utility level,
GA elite percentage for each agent type.
OA mutation rate (bit toggle probability).
Number of internal FSM states.
FSM memory (in bits) for past move recall.
// PARAMETER VALUES VARIED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
WorkSuppliers = 12 // Number of work suppliers NW.
Employers = 6 // Number of employers NE. '
WorkQuota =1 // Work offer quota wq.
EmployerQuota = 2 // Employer acceptance quota eg.
Table 5: Parameter Values for a Potential Economy E
with JCON=2 and JCAP=1.
Tight'Job Capacity B^alanced Job Capacity















w e w e - w • e
Balanced Job
Concentration -55.6 -25.7 ••-17.6 . -11.5 +17.4 -39.9













Tkble 6: Aggregate Market Power Outcomes. Means and standard
deviations for the maxket power mea.smes'MP^{s,E) and MPe{s,E) for
work suppHers w and employers e across.all runs s for each of the nine
tested potential economies E.
•X :.
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10-13 45% 6% 56% 51% 4% 42% 46% 0.41 1.55 -41% -M0%
(7%) (50%) (5%) (7%) (14%) (46%) (.19) (.27) {27%) (19%)
15-18 30% 88% 92% 90% 81% 1% 3% 0.04 0.14 -94% -89%
(28%) (19%) (11%) (22%) (3%) (6%) (.15) (.16) (22%). (10%)
Table 7(a): Tight Job Capacity (JCAP=l/2)
%of AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTI].ITY MPOWER
Runs w e w e w e w e w e
0-9 15% 6% 67% 17% 0% 28% 22% 0.69 2.06 -51% -27%
(8%) (47%) (24%) (0%) (39%) (31%) (.51) (.64) (36%) (23%)
12 80% 25% 17% 1% 0% 90% 86% 1.29 2.72 -8% -3%
(42%) (33%) (2%) (0%) (25%) (25%) (.19) (-14) (13%) (5%)
15 5% 100% 17% 75% 50% 0% 0% 0.13 0.79 -91% -72%
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Table 7(b): Balanced Job Capacity (JCAP=1)
%of
Runs
AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY MPOWER









































Table 7(c): Excess Job Capacity (JCAP=2)
Table 7: Experimental Findings for High Job Concentration






(c) Dominant Network for
Bzdanced Job Capacity (JCAP=1)
w w
(b)Dominant Network for
Tight Job Capacity (JCAP=l72)
. (d) Dominant Network for
Excess Job Capacity (JCAP=2)
Figure 1: Competitive and Dominant Persistent Networks for High Job Concentration
(JCON=2) and Varying Job Capacity Levels. A relatively larger solid-line box for work
suppliers w or employers e indicates a relatively Mgher attained mean market power level. Dash-
line boxes denote p-inactive agents. Straight-line directed arrows denote latched (continuoiis)
relationships and zig-zag directed arrows denote recurrent (random or periodic) relationships.
D" %oi AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY 1 M POWER
Runs w e w e w e w e [ \v 0
1-7 55% 2% 5% 23% 2% 74% 95% 0.87 1.3S 1 -3S%
(4%) (1%) (9%) (5%) (11%) (12%) (.13) (.04) (9%) (3%)
12-14 20% 10% 75% 38% 4% 48% 50% 0.88 1.46 -37% +49?
(18%) (43%) (9%) (7%) (25%) (42%) (.21) (.22) (15%) (lo%l
24 25% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% -0.12 -0.02 -109%
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0) (0) (0%) m)
Table 8(a): Tight Job Capacity (JCAP=l/2)
%of AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY MPOWER
Runs w e w e w e w e w e
1 5% 0% 0% 8% 0% 100% 100% 0.45 1.37 -68% -2%
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
12 70% 12% 31% 0% 0% 85% 85% 1.23 1.33 -12% -5%
(26%) (44%) (0%) (0%) (26%) (26%) (.19) (.14) (13%) (10%)
13-15 25% 63% 33% 13% 15% 48% 67% 1.08 0.97 -23% -31%
(45%) (40%) (4%) (3%) (40%) (35%) (.30) (.29) (21%) (21%)
Table 8(b): Balanced Job Capacity (JCAP=1)
D° %of AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY MPOWER
Runs w e w e w e w w e
0 5% 17% 0% 0% 0% 83% 100% 1.42 1.30 1% -7%
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
4-6 25% 2% 0% 0% 0% 98% 98% 1.37 1.38 -2% -1%
(3%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (.00) (.04) (0%) (2%)
14-17 70% 100% 29% 2% 29% 10% 60% 1.74 0.61 -i-26% -56%
(0%) (45%) (3%) (9%) (26%) (32%) (.32) (.27) (20%) (19%)
Table 8(c): Excess Job Capacity (JCAP=2)
Tkble 8: Experimental Findings for Balanced Job Concentration






(c) Dominant Network for




1 W I I w • i w •
(b)Dominant Network for
Tight Job;Capacity (JCAP.= l/2)
'e
(d) Dominant Network for
Excess Job Capacity (JCAP=2) .
(' 1
Figure 2: Competitive and Dominant Persistent Networks for Balanced Job Concen
tration (JCON=l) and Varying Job Capacity Levels. A relatively larger solid-line box for
work suppliers w or employers e indicates a relatively higher attained mean market power level.
Dash-line boxes denote pjinactive-agents;. Str^ght-line (Erected .arrows deno^ latched (continuous)
relationships and zig-zag directed arrows denote recurrent (random or periodic) relationships.
% of
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Table 9(a): Tight Job Capacity (JCAP=l/2)
%of AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY MPOWER
Runs w e w e w e w e w e
1 5% 0% 17% 0% 8% 83% 83% 1.11 1.39 -64% -1%
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
fi 80% 20% 33% 0% 0% 58% 60% 2.40 1.26 -14% -10%
(39%) (45%) (0%) (0%) (46%)' (47%) (.51) (.24) (18%) (17%)
7-8 15% 39% 36% 6% 11% 61% 28% 1,73. 1.21 -38% -14%
(44%) (45%) is%) (4%) (44%) (39%) (.49) (.18) (18% (13%)
Table 9(b): Balanced Job Capacity (JCAP=1)
%of
Runs
AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY MPOWER






























































Table 9(c): Excess Job Capacity (JCAP=2)
Table 9: Experimental Findings for Low Job Concentration





(c) Dominant Network for




Tight Job Capacity (JCAP=l/2)
(d) Dominant Network for
Excess Job Capacity (JCAP=2)
Figure 3: Competitive and Dominant Persistent Networks for Low Job Concentration
(JCON=l/2) and Varying Job Capacity Levels. A relatively larger solid-line boxfor work
suppliers w or employers e indicates a relatively higher attained mean market power level. Dash-
line boxes denote p-inactive agents. Straight-line directed arrows denote latched (continuous)
relationships and zig-zag directed arrows denote recurrent (random or periodic) relationships.
